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Abstract 
In this response to commentaries, we revisit the two main arguments of our target article. 
Based on data drawn from a variety of research areas – vocal behavior in nonhuman primates, 
speech physiology and pathology, neurobiology of basal ganglia functions, motor skill 
learning, paleoanthropological concepts – the target article, first, suggests a two-stage model 
of the evolution of the crucial motor prerequisites of spoken language within the hominin 
lineage: (1) monosynaptic refinement of the projections of motor cortex to brainstem nuclei 
steering laryngeal muscles, and (2) subsequent “vocal-laryngeal elaboration” of cortico-basal 
ganglia circuits, driven by human-specific FOXP2 mutations. Second, as concerns the 
ontogenetic development of verbal communication, age-dependent interactions between the 
basal ganglia and their cortical targets are assumed to contribute to the time course of the 
acquisition of articulate speech. Whereas such a phylogenetic reorganization of cortico-striatal 
circuits must be considered a necessary prerequisite for ontogenetic speech acquisition, the 30 
commentaries – addressing the whole range of data sources referred to – point at several 
further aspects of acoustic communication which have to be added to or integrated with the 
presented model. For example, the relationships between vocal tract movement 
sequencing – the focus of the target article – and rhythmical structures of movement 
organization, the connections between speech motor control and the central-auditory and 
central-visual systems, the impact of social factors upon the development of vocal behavior 
(in nonhuman primates and in our species), and the interactions of ontogenetic speech 
acquisition – based upon FOXP2-driven structural changes at the level of the basal 
ganglia – with preceding subvocal stages of acoustic communication as well as higher-order 
(cognitive) dimensions of phonological development. Most importantly, thus, several 
promising future research directions unfold from these contributions – accessible to clinical 





The 30 commentaries have elaborated upon all aspects of the target article, extending from 
vocal behavior in nonhuman primates to speech physiology and pathology, the neurobiology 
of basal ganglia functions, as well as motor skill learning and paleoanthropological concepts. 
In particular, the following issues have been addressed: (i) the capacities of nonhuman 
primates to control vocal behavior and to produce species-atypical calls; (ii) the constraints of 
vocal tract anatomy on vocalizations; (iii) the scope of birdsong as a model of – at least some 
aspects of – human spoken language; (iv) the relationship of the FOXP2 gene to motor 
functions – or, more specifically – vocal behavior across mammalian and avian taxa; (v) the 
contribution of corticobulbar tracts and brainstem central pattern generators – besides and 
beyond the basal ganglia – to acoustic human communication; (vi) the rhythmic organization 
and oscillatory underpinnings of behavior; (vii) the impact of auditory and audiovisual 
information as well as social factors on speech acquisition; (viii) the interactions of motor 
speech learning with preceding subverbal stages of acoustic communication; (ix) the 
contribution of cortico-striatal circuitry to “speech learning” in adulthood; (x) the broad range 
of cognitive basal ganglia functions beyond vocal-emotional expression and motor aspects of 
language; and, finally, (xi) paleoanthropological aspects of the target article such as the 
benefits of the initial articulatory efforts of our species and the speaking capabilities of 
Neanderthals. 
We gratefully appreciate all the contributions which have helped us to further specify our 
argument and have broadened our view on primate acoustic communication – in extant 
nonhuman cousins, extinct relatives from the genus Homo, and in our own species. In this 
response, we have organized the various commentaries into four broad subject areas: (a) 
nonhuman primate vocal behavior (and birdsong), which we discuss in section R2; (b) 
contributions of the basal ganglia to mature spoken language production/affective-vocal 
behavior (sect. R3); (c) role of the basal ganglia in ontogenetic speech acquisition (sect. R4); 
and (d) paleoanthropological perspectives of articulate speech acquisition (sect. R5). In the 
concluding section, R6, we summarize some of the main points/key questions likely to be 
entailed in further investigations of the phylogenetic reorganization of the basal ganglia. 
R2. Nonhuman primate vocal behavior: An 
underestimated or an inadequate vantage point for models 
of spoken language evolution? 
R2.1. Volitional control of vocal behavior in nonhuman primates 
Based upon a review of the behavioral organization and the neuroanatomic underpinnings of 
acoustic communication in nonhuman primates, we proposed in the target article that these 
species lack the capacity “to combine laryngeal and orofacial gestures into novel movement 
sequences” (sect. 2.3), rendering them virtually unable to generate even the simplest speech-
like vocal emissions, that is, acoustic events in the form of one or more syllable-shaped signal 
pulses. Several commentaries suggest that we might have underestimated the versatility of 
vocal functions in our primate relatives:  
1. 1. For example, commentators de Boer & Perlman report that Koko, a human-reared 
female gorilla, learned to display some species-atypical vocalizations (“breathy grunt-
like vocalizations” and “mock ‘coughs’”), indicating at least rudimentary voluntary 
laryngeal control. Comparable observations of species-atypical acoustic events 
(“extended grunts”) in captive chimpanzees, often as a component of multimodal and 
intentional display scenarios, are mentioned in the commentary by Meguerditchian, 
Taglialatela, Leavens, & Hopkins (Meguerditchian et al.) 
2. 2. Recent experiments by Weiss, Hotchkin, & Parks (Weiss et al.) found 
modification of the spectral structure (“spectral tilt”) of the vocalizations of cotton-top 
tamarins under specific conditions such as a noisy environment. 
3. 3. Finally, Lameira points at an eventually salient role of the voiceless calls of great 
apes in speech evolution, which are “underlined by voluntary control and maneuvering 
of supra-laryngeal articulators (...) in apparent homology to the articulatory 
movements of voiceless consonants.” 
We readily admit the existence of – though highly limited – volitional control over some 
aspects of vocal behavior in nonhuman primates. In fact, recent studies by one of us (Hage, 
and colleagues) show that rhesus monkeys are capable of volitionally initiating vocal output, 
that is, able to switch between two distinct call types from trial to trial in response to different 
visual cues in an operant conditioning task (Hage & Nieder 2013; Hage et al. 2013). 
Furthermore, single-cell recordings identified neurons in the monkey homologue of human 
Broca's area – located within the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex – that specifically predict such 
volitionally triggered calls, suggesting a crucial engagement of the monkey homologue of 
human Broca's area in vocal initiation processes, a putative precursor for speech control in the 
primate lineage (Hage & Nieder 2013). 
However, such preadaptations of human vocal tract motor control in our nonhuman relatives 
do not pose a threat to our model. To the contrary, a complete absence of any precursors 
would raise the question of how the suggested FOXP2-driven reorganization of cortico-
striatal circuits could have gained a foothold in the primate “communicating brain” in the first 
place. At the laryngeal level, nevertheless, learned species-atypical sounds are restricted to 
breathy-voiced (de Boer & Perlman) or extended grunts (Meguerditchian et al.). These 
vocalizations, therefore, lack a property which we consider essential to the communicative 
efficiency and the generative potential of the sound structures prevailing in all spoken 
languages, that is, the syllabic patterning of vocal tract movement sequences. This specific 
compositional principle requires the control of the laryngeal sound source to become part of a 
meshwork of phonetic gestures which are organized – on the basis of precisely defined phase-
relationships – as syllable-shaped gestural scores (e.g., Goldstein et al. 2006; see Figure 2C of 
the target article). 
Besides changes in spectral call features, the experiments by Weiss et al. – referred to in their 
commentary – gave rise to an increase in vocal amplitude in response to noise (Lombard 
effect). Under these conditions, modifications of call amplitude and spectral structure, 
conceivably, are rooted in a common cerebral mechanism and, thus, may represent 
components of a multifaceted vocal response pattern. Most probably, the Lombard 
effect – and its associated acoustic sequels – reflects involuntary changes of several call 
parameters such as amplitude, duration, repetition rate, and spectral composition in response 
to masking ambient noise rather than volitionally controlled modification of vocal output 
(e.g., Brumm & Slabbekoorn 2005; Brumm & Zollinger 2011). Recently, Hage and 
colleagues reported such vocal shifts to show an extremely brief delay and to emerge at a 
latency of less than a hundred milliseconds after noise onset (Hage et al. 2013). Taking into 
account that single neurons in the periaqueductal gray (PAG) change their vocalization-
related firing rates already around 400 msec prior to call onset (Larson & Kistler 1984), these 
results indicate that the Lombard effect – and at least one of its acoustic correlates – might be 
controlled by a neuronal network located within the brainstem rather than by superordinate 
higher-order brain structures. Furthermore, modifications of the spectral features of vocal 
output such as those reported by Weiss et al. might be caused by alterations of an animal's 
motivational state under different noise conditions. A study in squirrel monkeys has, for 
example, found an increase in aversion to be correlated with an upward shift of the maximal 
energy of the power spectrum of some call types (Fichtel et al. 2001). Taken together, 
changes in call structures do not necessarily point at specific volitional control capabilities, 
but may be mediated by lower-level brainstem mechanisms. 
R2.2. Auditory-motor interactions in nonhuman (and human) primates 
Reser & Rosa call attention to the tight relationship between perception and production of 
species-typical vocal behavior in nonhuman primates. Most importantly, “the basic apparatus 
employed for processing of speech sound parameters is phylogenetically conserved” and, 
thus, available to our cousins as well. As a hint towards tight connections between the 
auditory and the motor domains of human vocal behavior, specific motor circuits have been 
found to be recruited during the analysis of speech sound features, as described in the 
commentary by Pezzulo, Barca, & D'Ausilio (Pezzulo et al.). Besides frontal cortex, 
subcortical structures may contribute to these encoding processes as well (Ackermann & 
Brendel, in press). 
More specifically, speech acquisition represents a variant of “vocal production learning,” that 
is, the capacity “to reproduce by voice patterns of sound first received by ear,” as Merker 
writes (italics ours), and, therefore, must be expected to involve tight auditory-motor 
interconnections. However, the target article focuses on the motor side of vocal production 
learning, and herein rests, in our view, a major obstacle for speech acquisition in nonhuman 
primates (see also sect. R4 here). Nevertheless, as alluded to by Reser & Rosa, studies of the 
connections between central-auditory and central-motor systems in nonhuman primates, 
including limbic structures, should provide further opportunities for an elucidation of 
language evolution. As a highly intriguing aspect of the perception-production links within 
the domain of musicality, Honing & Merchant discuss the differential sensitivity to rhythm 
and beat in nonhuman primates as a basis for the proposed gradual audiomotor evolution 
hypothesis (see also the commentary by Ravignani, Martins, & Fitch [Ravignani et al.]). 
R2.3. Rhythmical entrainment and interlocutor coordination as speech 
precursors? 
Takahashi & Ghazanfar and Bryant have contributed two elucidating commentaries which 
suggest a precursor role of rhythmical facial activities and rhythmically entrained vocal and 
non-vocal behaviors in nonhuman primates for the rhythmical organization of verbal 
utterances, on the one hand, and for the coordination of interlocutors in human conversation, 
on the other. This notion conforms to recent phonetic accounts of speaking as a quasi-
rhythmically entrained motor activity (e.g., Cummins 2009), interlinked with rhythmical 
principles engaged in the organization of auditory speech perception (Rothermich et al. 2012). 
Thus, Peelle and Davis (2012) consider slow oscillatory activity of cortical neuronal 
assemblies as a physiological basis for the processing of quasi-rhythmical structures in speech 
comprehension, and Wilson and Wilson (2005) provided an oscillator model of the turn-
taking behavior of speakers during conversation. Hence, the rhythmical entrainment approach 
embarks on a close interlacing of vocal tract motor mechanism with auditory-perceptual 
processes in speech, and relates it to the cooperative nature of linguistic interactions. 
Allusions to the rhythmicity of spontaneous and posed laughter and to the role of laughter “in 
coordinating conversational timing,” as highlighted by Bryant, point at a deeply entrenched 
rhythmical basis of verbal utterances. Besides brainstem centers and the insula (see comments 
by Takahashi & Ghazanfar), most importantly, clinical and functional imaging studies in 
humans suggest the rhythmical organization of verbal vocal behavior to be associated with the 
basal ganglia (e.g., Ackermann et al. 1997b; Konczak et al. 1997; Riecker et al. 2002). 
Furthermore, rhythmical entrainment processes during speech production may serve as a 
target of therapeutic intervention techniques in speech-disordered patients (e.g., Brendel & 
Ziegler 2008). So far, nevertheless, “very little is known about the neural mechanisms 
underlying the production of rhythmic communication signals in human and nonhuman 
primates” (as Takahashi & Ghazanfar point out in their commentary), and this issue, surely, 
deserves further investigations. 
The commentary by Takahashi & Ghazanfar draws attention to, among other things, 
experimental work on lip-smacking in nonhuman primates, an emotional social signal whose 
frequency largely corresponds to the syllabic rhythm of human speech. It is an intriguing 
idea – and a valuable expansion of the frame/content concept developed by MacNeilage and 
Davis (2001; see also MacNeilage 1998; 2008) – that the superimposition of a voice signal 
onto the lip-smacking cycle in gelada baboons has rendered this social signal audible and 
may, thereby, have paved the way for the evolution of speech as a rhythmical oral-facial-
laryngeal activity within auditory-visual displays. From the perspective of the model 
developed in our target article, however, the notion of two parallel layers of lip-smacking and 
vocalization behavior still lacks an important ingredient: The phonatory mechanisms 
generating the voice signal during speaking involve a precisely timed and smooth interaction 
of laryngeal gestures with the movements of supralaryngeal movements as sketched in Figure 
2C of the target article. Considering the “inextricable link between vocal output and facial 
expressions” mentioned by Takahashi & Ghazanfar, comparative investigations of the neural 
bases of vocal behavior and non-vocal facial expression are definitely warranted. As noted in 
the commentary by Meguerditchian et al., the vocal behavior of chimpanzees is associated, 
depending upon communicative content, with differential orofacial motor asymmetries. 
R2.4. Commonalities between birdsong and human spoken language: A more 
adequate vantage point for scenarios of spoken language evolution? 
Apart from a brief final paragraph related to birdsong, the target article focuses on precursors 
of spoken language within the primate clade, trying to “delineate how these remarkable motor 
capabilities [underlying speech production] could have emerged in our hominin ancestors” 
(target article, Abstract). Four commentaries plead for a broader perspective, including, 
especially, avian vocal behavior (Beckers, Berwick, & Bolhuis [Beckers et al.], Merker, 
Petkov & Jarvis, Pezzulo et al.). Beckers et al. even raise the concern that – with respect to 
speech and language – “common descent may not be a reliable guiding principle for 
comparative research” and, most importantly, that this approach may miss the unique aspects 
of language per se, “given the already strong parallels between humans and songbirds in terms 
of auditory-vocal imitation learning, and the often remarkable articulatory skills in many 
avian species” (see also the first paragraph of the commentary by Merker for a similar 
argument). It goes without saying that a broader perspective would have provided a more 
elucidating scenario, and might have helped to define the major constraints acting upon 
speech evolution mechanisms and to narrow down research questions in primate studies. But 
all the commonalities between human verbal communication and the acoustic behavior of 
non-primate mammals or songbirds cannot dispense us from the challenge of clarifying – in 
sufficient detail – how highly vocal, but speechless primates have ultimately acquired the 
unique motor capabilities that enable us to gossip in well-articulated utterances. As a matter of 
fact, “there is little direct comparative evidence in the primate literature to suggest that the 
cortico-striatal-thalamic system is strikingly different in humans relative to nonhuman 
primates” (Petkov & Jarvis). In our proposal, the differences are restricted to the vocal 
domain and involve a – within the primate lineage – human-specific vocal elaboration of 
otherwise primate-general cortico-striatal circuits, allowing for the sequencing of laryngeal 
and supralaryngeal gestures according to auditory templates (see comments of Zenon & 
Olivier for a discussion of sequencing as a basic basal ganglia function, see also Lieberman's 
commentary). 
R3. The basal ganglia in mature speech production and 
affective-vocal behavior: A major player or a negligible 
factor? 
Based upon behavioral and neurobiological data obtained from nonhuman primates and from 
our species, we have argued for a crucial role of the basal ganglia during mature speech 
production in terms of the implementation of emotive prosody, that is, the “affective tone” of 
verbal utterances. A series of recent functional imaging studies, indeed, provides further 
evidence for an engagement of the basal ganglia in affective-vocal behavior, as highlighted in 
the commentary by Frühholz, Sander, & Grandjean (Frühholz et al.). However, we are by 
no means suggesting that basal ganglia functions are restricted to “just simple emotional 
prosodic modulation” – a critical objection brought forward by Ravignani et al. By contrast, 
we fully acknowledge that “the basal ganglia support multiple functions relevant to spoken 
language” and that, more specifically, these subcortical structures must be expected to engage 
in “complex syntactic and semantic processing in adults” (see fifth paragraph of the 
commentary by Ravignani et al.). Against the background of several parallel but interacting 
basal ganglia loops, including limbic, motor, and cognitive components (see, e.g., Fig. 3 of 
the target article), multiple contributions of the basal ganglia to speech and language are not 
only conceivable, but must even be expected. Thus, we agree that syntactic (Teichmann et al. 
2005; Ullman 2001) and semantic (Cardona et al. 2013) processes may hinge upon cortico-
striatal circuits (see also our response to Lieberman in subsequent paragraphs). 
Furthermore, the target article by no means “assumes that prosodic modulation of speech 
conveys mainly simple motivational-emotional information” – a concern raised by Ravignani 
et al. (see Note 1 of the target article). We excluded linguistic prosody from our review 
because the modulation of prosody by human-specific cognitive functions (e.g., syntax) is, 
most presumably, a component of the left-hemisphere language system and must be strictly 
separated – both at the functional and the neuroanatomic level – from emotive prosody (see, 
e.g., Sidtis & Van Lancker Sidtis 2003). As a consequence, we fully support the suggestion 
that linguistic prosody is related to “human-specific cognitive functions,” which – in contrast 
to emotional tone – “are clearly not evolutionary homologues of primate emotional 
vocalizations” (Ravignani et al.). 
The first part of Lieberman's comments also raises a strong argument for a broad variety of 
motor, cognitive, and behavioral functions of the basal ganglia, based upon “a network of 
segregated cortical-to-basal neural circuits linking areas of motor cortex and prefrontal 
cortex.” The common basic operation across these domains seems to be the task-dependent 
“switching” between motor and cognitive responses or movements during “internally guided 
acts.” Section 4.3.1. of the target article pays full credit to this firmly established model. 
Nevertheless, more recent work shows that interconnections between these loops are also of 
considerable importance (see Fig. 3 of the target article), especially in order to better 
understand the striatal interface of emotional/motivational and motor functions as well as the 
psychomotor aspects of striatal disorders (see, e.g., Jankovic 2008). 
While we support the main thrust of Lieberman's argument, we have some concerns over the 
clinical data referred to, that is, the contention that the “speech production deficits of 
Parkinson's disease and focal lesions to the basal ganglia are qualitatively similar to ones 
occurring in aphasia.” As regards speech motor impairments in a narrow sense, there is 
definitely no similarity between Parkinson's dysarthria, on the one hand, and speech apraxia 
or phonological impairments after left anterior cortical lesions, on the other. We acknowledge 
that disorders of the basal ganglia have been observed to give rise – though rather 
infrequently – to mostly transitory syndromes of an aphasia (but not compromised speech), 
and the concept of “subcortical aphasia” has been widely acknowledged. Nevertheless, any 
interpretation of these findings in terms of the relevant functional-neuroanatomic substratum 
must take into account alternative interpretations. First, left-hemispheric subcortical lesions 
may give rise to diaschisis effects within the overlying fronto-temporal cortex, that is, 
hypometabolism – and subsequent dysfunction – of the perisylvian “language zones” (Weiller 
et al. 1993). Second, more advanced stages of Parkinson's disease and so-called atypical 
Parkinsonian syndromes may be associated with damage to cortical areas affecting, 
eventually, language functions. 
A further critical comment put forward by Ravignani et al. also relates to the role of the basal 
ganglia in higher-order language processing. Based on experiments probing the learning of 
novel syntactic structures in adults, they claim that these subcortical nuclei engage in the 
retrieval – rather than the acquisition – of overlearned procedures, implicitly suggesting that a 
similar relationship should hold for motor speech processes as well. Yet, the short-term 
encoding of artificial syntactic structures under experimental conditions in adulthood and their 
subsequent retrieval are not necessarily the same thing as the long-term acquisition of speech 
motor routines during infancy and childhood, and their retrieval in adults need not depend on 
the same cerebral network. These suggestions could explain why the findings of novel syntax 
learning experiments are not compatible with the clinical data obtained from speech-
disordered infants and adults cited in our target article (sect. 4.3.2.), which demonstrate that 
the engagement of the basal ganglia declines – though it does not necessarily cease – across 
the time course of speech acquisition. 
Commentators Hasson, Llano, Miceli, & Dick (Hasson et al.) raise principal concerns over 
the “viability of BG [basal ganglia] as a speech/emotion synthesizer,” since these subcortical 
structures lack “the capacity to monitor and correct for related errors, that is, evaluate that the 
intended emotive tone/prosody was instantiated.” They argue that: (i) The basal ganglia 
cannot provide the necessary fast auditory feedback; (ii) processing of emotive prosody is 
mainly bound to lateral-temporal systems of the cortex; and (iii) basal ganglia dysfunctions 
fail to compromise the perception of “emotional speech variations.” Parenthetically, it is 
indeed the case that patients with Parkinson's disease – at least in more advanced stages – may 
show impaired emotion recognition (see, e.g., Breitenstein et al. 1998). More importantly, 
however, the basic premise of the argument is – in our view – unwarranted. We by no means 
want to curtail the relevance of (auditory) feedback within the domain of (speech) motor 
control, but why must the basal ganglia – in order to implement emotive prosody – be 
embedded into a “fast” feedback loop? Rather, as suggested by Frühholz et al., the “temporal 
slow prosodic modulations of emotional speech … seem to rely on feedback processing in the 
AC [auditory cortex].” But whatever the role of auditory feedback within the area of vocal-
emotional processing, the suggestions of Hasson et al. are at variance with a solid tradition of 
clinical neurology. All Parkinsonian symptoms are, for example, “dependent on the emotional 
state of the patient” (Jankovic 2008). Based upon, among other things, such observations, it is 
widely acknowledged that the basal ganglia operate as a dopamine-dependent interface 
between the limbic system and various motor areas (see, e.g., Mogenson et al. 1980, referred 
to in sect. 4.2.2. of the target article). Vocal-affective expression represents just one aspect of 
this broader spectrum of psychomotor basal ganglia functions (the second part of the 
commentary by Zenon & Olivier provides a lucent account of these relationships). The 
projections from the limbic to the motor basal ganglia loop can be considered the 
neurobiological substratum of psychomotor interactions, and this circuitry 
represents – contrary to the claims by Hasson et al. – a relatively well-established functional-
neuroanatomic model at this time, extending from the level of systems physiology to the level 
of molecular biology (see sect. 4.3. of the target article). 
Besides the structures depicted in Figure 4 of the target article, which centers around the basal 
ganglia, further cortical and subcortical structures engage in speech motor control or, more 
generally, contribute to verbal communication – such as the anterior cingulate cortex (briefly 
referred to in the last part of sect. 4.3.1. of the target article), rostral parts of the inferior 
frontal gyrus, auditory cortical areas, and the cerebellum (see Frühholz et al.'s commentary). 
Whereas these regions do not play a significant role in our argument, we, nevertheless, highly 
appreciate Frühholz et al.'s Figure 1, which incorporates the afore-mentioned structures into 
Figure 4 of the target article. Interestingly, both Hasson et al.'s and Frühholz et al.'s 
commentaries proffer the cerebellum – rather than the basal ganglia – as the region most 
likely to “imbue speech with emotive content” (Hasson et al.'s phrase for the role these 
authors see us attributing to the BG). A significant contribution of the “small brain” to speech 
motor control is beyond any dispute (Ackermann 2008), though, in parentheses, the 
cerebellum does not appear to pertain to the cerebral network underlying acoustic 
communication in nonhuman primates (e.g., Kirzinger 1985). However, cerebellar disorders 
do not give rise to a constellation of motor aprosodia, that is, a monotonous and hypophonic 
voice lacking affective deflections as in Parkinson's disease (for reviews, see Ackermann & 
Brendel, in press; Ackermann et al. 2007). Instead, the syndrome of ataxic dysarthria is 
predominantly characterized by articulatory deficits with irregular distortions of consonants 
and vowels. The cerebellar cognitive affective syndrome – referred to by Hasson et al. – has 
been reported, admittedly, to comprise abnormalities of speech prosody in terms of a high-
pitched voice of a “whining, childish and hypophonic quality,” emerging, especially, in 
bilateral or generalized disease processes (Schmahmann & Sherman 1998, p. 564; eight 
patients out of a total of 20 subjects with cerebellar pathology). Most presumably, these 
perceived voice abnormalities reflect impaired lower-level, that is, reflex-mediated control of 
pitch stability in a subgroup of cerebellar patients as documented, for example, by Ackermann 
and Ziegler (1994) – rather than a compromised ability to “imbue speech with emotive 
content.” 
Vicario points out that the target article does not pay any attention to the role of serotonin, 
that is, “another key monoamine of the reward system” besides the neurotransmitter 
dopamine. We highly appreciate this observation. Apart from Parkinson's disease, major 
depression may also give rise to a monotonous/hypophonic voice lacking affective deflection 
(e.g., Alpert et al. 2001; Cohn et al. 2009; Ellgring & Scherer 1996), and this clinical 
constellation is assumed to be associated with an imbalance of serotonergic (and 
noradrenergic) neurotransmission – a still central, though not sufficient pathophysiological 
model (Massart et al. 2012). Vicario speculates that “dopamine subserves reward-oriented 
(e.g., approach) communication, while serotonin subserves punishment-oriented (e.g., threat) 
communication.” Conceivably, thus, both dopamine and serotonin depletion might converge 
upon “motor aprosodia” as a default vocal constellation. In contrast to the dopamine, 
unfortunately, the neurobiological bases of serotonin effects are still by far less elaborated. 
Any attempt towards an integration of both neurotransmitter systems into a common 
functional-neuroanatomic framework of the control of vocal behavior remains, thus, 
premature at the moment. 
R4. Basal ganglia and ontogenetic speech acquisition: A so 
far neglected role of cortico-striatal circuits? 
Besides adult speech production (see sect. R3.) and phylogenetic language evolution (see 
sects. R5.1. and R5.2.), the target article proposes a crucial role of the basal ganglia in the 
ontogenetic development of verbal communication. Several commentaries correctly point at 
the multilevel and multifaceted organization of an individual's speech development and, 
correctly, complain that the target article misses one or another aspect of this more complex 
picture: For example, (i) “the impact of the proximal social environment” (Aitken) on the 
ontogenetic emergence of communicative capacities (Aitken and Bornstein & Esposito); (ii) 
the influence of auditory-perceptual abilities already available to newborns and young infants 
(auditory streaming, speech sound discrimination, melody processing) upon vocal imitation 
capacities (Lenti Boero; see also Reser & Rosa for the domain of nonhuman primates); (iii) 
the role of comprehension “which almost by law ontogenetically and cognitively precedes 
production” during speech development (Bornstein & Esposito); (iv) the – highly 
intriguing – influence of listening to the vocalizations of nonhuman primates on cognitive 
core-capacities such as concept formation in infants during the first months of life (Ferguson, 
Perszyk, & Waxman [Ferguson et al.]); (v) the “possibility to refer to an object” (Lenti 
Boero); (v) and the obvious fact that speech motor plasticity does not – or at least must 
not – end after childhood (McGettigan & Scott). 
At the end of the target article (sect. 7, “Conclusions”), we have briefly mentioned the 
importance of auditory-motor networks and the social environment within the context of 
phylogenetic language evolution. We readily acknowledge that these functional 
interconnections also hold for ontogenetic speech development. However, the target article 
focuses on a distinct, but crucial, motor aspect of the acquisition of articulate speech, that is, 
the concatenation of vocal tract movements into coarticulated syllabic sequences; and a more 
exhaustive account would have been beyond the scope of the review. Nevertheless, two 
commentaries touch upon the motor level of ontogenetic speech development. Whereas the 
target article focuses on the emergence of increasingly overlearned sequences of consonant-
vowel syllables, the commentaries by Oller and Lenti Boero further specify the preverbal 
vocalizations of infants. 
Oller points out that “phonatory events” (“protophones”) lacking significant supralaryngeal, 
that is, articulatory, modification characterize the early stages of human vocal development, 
especially, the first 3 months of life. These observations indicate the maturation of the 
laryngeal apparatus to precede the maturation of the cortico-striatal circuits bound to language 
production. At least in this regard, ontogeny, thus, appears to recapitulate phylogeny. 
Furthermore, Lenti Boero highlights the “radical transformation” of human vocal behavior 
during the first year of life, that is, “the substitution of the cry, an analog signal . . . with 
articulated speech-like sounds.” Whereas infant cries, most presumably, depend upon a 
primate-general cerebral network, it is, in our view, the cortico-striatal circuitry which then 
steps in as a prerequisite of speech motor learning. 
Our focus on the contribution of cortico-striatal circuits to speech acquisition in childhood by 
no means excludes a persisting engagement of the basal ganglia in speech motor plasticity 
mechanisms at a more advanced age. Indeed, as illustrated by McGettigan & Scott in their 
comment, adaptive adjustments of speaking extend well into adulthood and even 
senescence – in response to a variety of internal and external conditions such as alterations of 
peripheral-anatomic structures during aging or ambient dialectal influences causing gradual 
sound changes in adults. We are not aware of any data supporting the implication of the basal 
ganglia in such extended speech motor adaptation mechanisms, but a recent functional 
imaging found cortico-striatal circuits to be engaged in second language vocabulary learning 
(Hosoda et al. 2013; see commentary by Hanakawa & Hosoda). Since the experimental 
design of this study emphasized pronunciation training, the task must, apparently, have 
challenged the motor aspects of speech production. Though adult second language learning 
cannot be equated with the adaptive mechanisms influencing adult speech, these data point at 
least at the possibility of a significant contribution of the basal ganglia to a continuing process 
of modulation of motor speech mechanisms across adulthood – based, presumably, upon 
dopaminergic reward signals associated with successful articulatory performance (see also the 
comments by Vicario, and further discussion below). Hence, our proposal does not assume 
two distinct computational subsystems of the basal ganglia supporting immature and mature 
speech motor control, respectively. We rather aimed at presenting a model in which these 
subcortical nuclei assume two roles, that is, (i) a system supporting speech motor learning 
mechanisms, and (ii) a pivot between motivational-emotive and volitional mechanisms during 
speaking, with a gradual decrease of the importance of the former component during the 
maturation of speech motor control. 
Any attempt towards a more comprehensive neurobiological model of human speech 
production, integrating phylogenetically older (vocal-emotional displays, including affective 
prosody) and more recent components (construction of syllables and wordforms), must 
address the contribution of the various central pattern generators of the brainstem to spoken 
language (see sect. 3.1. and Fig. 4 of the target article). Admittedly, however, the respective 
discussion of the target article has a still highly preliminary character – because (adult) speech 
pathology lacks adequate clinical model systems. Marschik, Kaufmann, Bölte, Sigafoos, & 
Einspieler (Marschik et al.) point at a further approach to the analysis of the operation of the 
central pattern generators within the speech domain, that is, neurodevelopmental disorders 
such as Rett syndrome, a highly promising future research area. 
R5. Paleoanthropological perspectives of articulate speech 
acquisition: How did peripheral and cerebral adaptations 
interact, and does a focus on functional anatomy miss the 
crucial parts of the story? 
R5.1. Corticobulbar-laryngeal and striatal contributions to spoken language 
evolution: Who takes the lead? 
The introductory section of the target article suggests the “inability of nonhuman primates to 
produce even the most simple verbal utterances” to be due to “more crucial” cerebral 
limitations of motor control rather than vocal tract anatomy (sect. 1.1, para. 3). Deliberately, 
this formulation (“more crucial”) does not exclude additional phylogenetic adaptations of the 
human speech apparatus at a peripheral level, including the shape of the vocal folds – as 
suggested by de Boer & Perlman. These authors hint at a larger source-filter coupling in 
apes as compared to human vocal tract anatomy – an observation that seems to reinforce our 
notion of the human larynx as an independent and coordinate player within the orchestra of 
speech organs (see Fig. 2C of the target article). Obviously, the strongly coupled source-filter 
system of apes does not allow for the same versatility of acoustic pattern generation as the 
(relatively) uncoupled human system. As a consequence, the control of the more independent 
source and filter mechanisms of the human vocal apparatus – specifically, the coordination of 
laryngeal and supralaryngeal gestures – must involve the regulation of a greater number of 
degrees-of-freedom and, therefore, should require enhanced neural control mechanisms. 
Against this background, the “vocal elaboration” of the cortico-striatal circuitry described in 
our model nicely meshes with the peripheral vocal tract modifications that may have occurred 
within the hominin lineage – in line with the comments by de Boer & Perlman. 
Lieberman strongly rejects the assumption of a major contribution of monosynaptic 
corticobulbar connections to the phylogenetic development of articulate speech: He writes, 
“in itself, enhanced laryngeal control of phonation would not have yielded the encoding of 
segmental phonemes that is a unique property of human speech.” In stark contrast, Merker 
deemphasizes the role of the basal ganglia and puts the corticobulbar connections to the front 
of the stage: He suggests “it is even conceivable that the ‘simple’ addition, in ancestral Homo, 
of a direct primary motor cortex efference to . . . medullary motor nuclei sufficed to recruit 
the already present cerebral territories centered on Wernicke's and Broca's areas (...) to the 
practice-based acquisition of complex vocal output” in terms of articulate speech. In this 
perspective, the role of “FOXP2 enhancement of cortico-basal ganglia function in the human 
line” is restricted to the provision of “extra storage capacity” (Merker). As convincingly 
argued for by Lieberman in his commentary (and relevant books), enhanced, FOXP2-driven 
“basal ganglia synaptic plasticity and connectivity” represents a necessary prerequisite for 
vocal learning, including speech acquisition. In accordance with the commentary of Merker, 
we assume, however, that enhanced cerebral control of the larynx via monosynaptic 
corticobulbar connections represents a necessary prerequisite of speech production as well, 
providing, for instance, the basis for the generation of fast, ballistic laryngeal gestures such as 
those engaged in the production of unvoiced stop consonants (two-stage model of the 
phylogenetic development of articulate speech; see target article, Abstract). 
R5.2. FOXP2-driven striatal reorganization during spoken language evolution 
The (second part of the) commentary by Aitken provides a concise review of the multiple 
linguistic/nonlinguistic targets of FOXP2 (and its nonhuman cognates) across a variety of 
species as well as the linguistic/nonlinguistic dysfunctions following disruption of this gene 
locus. It concludes: “FOXP2 is insufficient to account for the development of human 
language or its neural and neurochemical substrates. It is a proxy marker for the genetic 
control of complex biological systems we are only beginning to define or understand.” 
Similarly, Johansson curtails the contribution of this gene to phylogenetic language 
development: “The changes in FOXP2 in the human lineage quite likely are connected with 
some aspects of language, but the connection is not nearly as direct as early reports claimed, 
and as Ackermann et al. apparently assume.” 
We fully agree with these statements, which deny an – exclusive and/or 
exhaustive – contribution of FOXP2 to the evolution of the human language system. Our 
model proposes only a significant – and necessary – contribution of FOXP2 to the 
phylogenetic emergence of motor aspects (!) of spoken language (we leave open the question 
of an engagement in higher-order cognitive dimensions of acoustic communication, see our 
response to Lieberman above). Against this background, we really – in the words of 
Johansson (2005, p. 27) – “begin to define or understand the genetic control of the complex 
biological system” of spoken language at the motor level since a plausible account of the 
underlying neurophysiological mechanisms and molecular-biological substrata can be 
envisaged in terms of enhanced “basal ganglia synaptic plasticity and connectivity” 
(Lieberman). 
Admittedly, “the apparent presence of human FOXP2 in Neanderthals does not in itself prove 
that Neanderthals spoke” (an argument put forward by Johansson) in terms of mastering the 
syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic level of a full-fledged language system, and the target 
article does not make such a claim. Yet, there is no reason to assume that Neanderthals were 
“quiet people” who “lacked completely articulate speech” (Fagan 2010, Ch. 4). We think that 
Neanderthals – even if they did not attain higher-order linguistic capabilities – had the 
functional-anatomic prerequisites to enrich their “Hmmmmm” vocalizations (Mithen 2006) 
by syllabic articulatory gestures – giving rise, presumably, to more salient vocal displays 
(some kind of elaborated “babbling”). The target article leaves open the question of the origin 
of the human FOXP2 variant in Neanderthals and does not – cannot – rule out the still 
controversial topic of interbreeding between these two hominin species. However, this issue is 
not a crucial aspect of our argument, which rests upon the notion that at least the functionally 
relevant human FOXP2 mutation arose in a large brain with monosynaptic corticobulbar 
connections to the distal cranial nerve nuclei at its disposal. Any modifications of the 
proposed scenario that shift these events into a more recent time window do not compromise 
our suggestions. 
Two commentaries raise concerns over the paleoanthropological scenario put forward in the 
target article, linking the emergence of articulate speech to a preceding elaboration of 
nonverbal vocal displays. Ravignani et al. challenge the – alleged – assumption of our model 
that “enhancement of in-group cooperation and cohesion was the main driving force for the 
evolution of speech” (their words). And Johansson claims: “Vocal displays as the selective 
driver of protolanguage evolution (...) are highly unlikely, as they would drive the evolution 
of something more resembling birdsong than language.” First, FOXP2-driven striatal 
reorganization in humans does not give rise to “something more resembling birdsong than 
language” since it took place within a human brain, endowed with a highly differentiated 
conceptual system even, most presumably, prior to the emergence of language (see, e.g., 
Hurford 2007). And, furthermore, this development played out in a more elaborate social 
environment as compared to other species (see commentaries by Catania and Pezzulo et al.). 
In our view, second, preverbal vocal displays – whether or not within the context of 
coordinated group activities – served as a preadaptation for speech acquisition rather than a 
“selective driver of protolanguage evolution.” More specifically, vocal displays enriched by 
sequences of syllable-sized articulatory gestures (resembling elaborated “babbling” instead of 
“Hmmmmm”; see above) could have supported and promoted the initial stages of the 
phylogenetic trajectory towards spoken language – at a point in time when the benefits of a 
full-fledged spoken language were not yet available, even not imaginable. Most importantly, 
this model aims at an answer to the quest for the adaptive benefits of a “first word” as raised 
by Bickerton (2009; see second last paragraph of sect. 5.2. in the target article). The 
commentaries by Catania as well as Pezzulo et al. provide lucid and valuable ideas relevant 
for a further specification of the forces which “might have contributed to transform 
vocalization from an initially quite limited sensorimotor feat to a powerful, open-ended 
instrumental tool that permits conveying rich communicative intentions” (Pezzulo et al.). For 
example, the more sophisticated interactions at the disposal of our species, such as joint 
attention (Pezzulo et al.) and/or environmental contingencies in the social context of how 
“one human can get another to do something” (Catania), should have paved the way towards a 
verbal code of acoustic communication – after a FOXP2-driven vocal reorganization of 
cortico-striatal circuits provided the sensorimotor prerequisites of spoken language. 
R5.3. Extensions of the proposed model of phylogenetic articulate speech 
development 
The new “dual-pathway model” of language evolution presented in the target article is vividly 
rejected by Clark because it omits “the recent small, but credible, neuroimaging literature 
which contradicts this assertion and implicates human cortico-striatal-thalamic circuitry in 
disambiguating lexical (…), grammatical (…), and semantic (…) uncertainties in perceived 
language.” Most presumably, the task of disambiguation of verbal utterances rather hinges 
predominantly on cortical areas (see, e.g., Wittforth et al. 2010). In any case, there is ample 
clinical and experimental evidence for multiple contributions of the basal ganglia to language 
perception and production, and the model of multiple cortico-striatal loops (see above) allows 
these subcortical nuclei to subserve both motor-limbic and cognitive aspects of spoken 
language. More specifically, elementary basal ganglia operations such as the generation and 
filtering of signal variances – as assumed by Clark in his commentary (second 
paragraph) – may be recruited within different domains of behavior (see also the comments 
by Zenon & Olivier and Lieberman). Interestingly, these comments put the suggestion of a 
contribution of cortico-striatal circuits to the disambiguation of vocal behavior/verbal 
information into an evolutionary context: The basal ganglia are assumed to set “limits on 
useful complexity of naturally communicated information” (Clark) in terms of a trade-off 
between the (desired) signal recognition by intended observers and (unwanted) social 
eavesdropping. Although Clark does not further specify the mechanisms of the assumed 
cortico-striatal “complexity scaling of communication,” assumed to extend “along the 
continuum of signals to protolanguage to language,” these considerations, nevertheless, touch 
upon a significant problem of language evolution: Whereas a speaker should take measures to 
safeguard the signal against social eavesdroppers, a listener must ascertain signal honesty. 
Increased voluntary control over vocal behavior and the “low costs” of verbal utterances 
facilitate deception and raise the question of how trust as a prerequisite of human cooperation 
can emerge and be maintained (e.g., Sterelny 2012, Ch. 5). Rather than the basal ganglia, 
enhanced mind-reading capabilities and memory storage capacities – associated with 
neocortical areas – must be considered the relevant tools for the evaluation of the reliability of 
a signal's content. 
The contribution by Mattei adds an interesting novel aspect to the evolutionary scenario of 
the target article, which further strengthens – in our view – the suggested proposal: This 
commentary puts the paleoanthropological inferences of the target article into the perspective 
of complex adaptive system (CAS) analysis and highlights that the phylogenetic processes 
driving the emergence of speech production within the hominin lineage – “refinement in the 
projections from the motor cortex to the brainstem nuclei . . . as well as the further 
development of vocalization-specific cortico-basal ganglia circuitries” – can be considered a 
“breakthrough change” of signaling resources triggering the “percolation of the whole system 
and the emergence of new unpredictable features” (Mattei). As a consequence, relatively 
small reorganizational processes within the motor system may have supported “the emergence 
of high-level cognitive functions . . . from ancestral structures already present in nonhuman 
primates” (as Zenon & Olivier observe).  
R6. Summary/conclusions 
The target article focuses upon the – often neglected – motor aspects of spoken language 
evolution and emphasizes the crucial role of a vocal elaboration of cortico-striatal circuits 
within the hominin lineage – driven, most presumably, by a human-specific variant of the 
FOXP2 gene. As a consequence, the control of the laryngeal sound source could have become 
part of a meshwork of phonetic gestures that are molded – via precisely defined phase-
relationships – into syllable-shaped motor patterns. Such a phylogenetic reorganization of the 
basal ganglia must be considered necessary, but does not represent an already sufficient 
prerequisite for ontogenetic speech acquisition in our species – as demonstrated by the highly 
appreciated comments to the target article. Furthermore, the various commentaries point at a 
series of research questions which deserve further consideration and which are accessible to 
clinical/experimental investigations in our species as well as, at least partially, nonhuman 
primates. For example:  
1. (a) Basal ganglia: Given a multitude of distinct cortico-striatal circuits, a “variegated” 
engagement of the basal ganglia in human communication must be taken into account, 
including, among other things, the modulation of higher-order aspects of speech 
production – bound, presumably, to the operation of the so-called “cognitive 
loop” – and the integration of vocal and non-vocal (facial, gestural) aspects of 
emotional expression. Against the background of well-established analogies between 
the human or mammalian basal ganglia and the avian “song brain,” the interactions of 
the cortico-striatal circuits with the central-auditory system both during ontogenetic 
speech acquisition and mature speech production must be addressed in more detail. 
Finally, the conceivable interactions between the neurotransmitter serotonin and the 
“striatal messenger” dopamine during vocal-emotional expression await further 
elucidation. 
2. (b) Speech motor control mechanism: The relationship between vocal tract movement 
sequencing – the focus of the target article – and the rhythmic structure of verbal 
utterances as well as other domains of behavior must be further addressed in a 
comparative-biological perspective. For example, the influential frame/content model 
of speech development (MacNeilage 2008) points at the supplementary motor area 
(SMA) as a crucial component of the cortical network of spoken language production, 
a mesiofrontal structure tightly interconnected with the basal ganglia. 
3. (c) Ontogenetic speech acquisition: The suggested model of a pivotal role of the basal 
ganglia during ontogenetic speech/language development must be further 
substantiated. As an important research perspective within the clinical domain, the 
articulatory/phonatory deficits due to specific cerebral disorders such as Rett 
syndrome or isolated damage to the putamen must be further characterized, based 
upon hypothesis-driven fine-grained perceptual and acoustic evaluation procedures. 
Furthermore, the notion of a pivotal contribution of the basal ganglia to the 
ontogenetic acquisition of speech motor skills must be embedded into a broader 
framework, including the preceding subverbal stages of vocal behavior and higher-
order aspects of phonological development. 
Unfortunately, the most interesting aspect of spoken language, that is, its emergence in the 
first place, eludes so far a more direct examination, although molecular-genetic data begin to 
shed some light on this issue. As exemplified by the commentaries on the target article, this 
light does not yet unravel a brightly illuminated and, thus, unambiguous scenario. 
Nevertheless, the FOXP2-story nicely fits into the context of our current understanding of 
speech motor control mechanisms and primate vocal behavior. Ultimately, we hope that the 
suggestions of the target article on phylogenetic and ontogenetic speech acquisition, centered 
around the basal ganglia, will help to pave the way towards a better understanding of the 
“end-point” of these developmental trajectories, that is, the cortical organization of mature 
speech production in relation to, for example, the hemispheric lateralization effects of 
communicative behavior in our closest cousins. 
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